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I. Introduction 
The decline in the quality of bank loan portfolios was a core problem 
within the U.S. banking system during the recent financial crises (Kauko, 2011). 
Mortgage delinquencies spiked, and the large amount of bad debt led to 
stagnation in the economy (Sanders, 2008). Non-performing loans (NPLs) have 
similarly been linked to other financial crises around the world, including the 
crisis in the Eurozone (Maki, Tsagkanos, & Bellas, 2014) and the Asian financial 
crisis (Yang, 2003). Researchers have investigated the negative correlation 
between the number of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the economy and economic 
conditions; finding that NPLs are generally more prevalent during times of 
recession (Makri, Tsagkanos & Bellas, 2014). There are a variety of studies 
focused on NPLs on a macroeconomic scale, as noted above. To the best of my 
knowledge, however, there exists very little information on privately held NPLs 
outside the banking industry. 
The purpose of my paper is to add to the existing literature by examining 
whether certain NPL loan characteristics (such as, the current interest rate, 
delinquent taxes, current interest and principle payment, current taxes and 
insurance payment, days in foreclosure, reason for default, occupancy status, 
property condition, neighborhood condition, liquidation type, days held, UPB, 
Acquisition BPO and state) lead to more profitable outcomes when being purchased 
by non-banking firms. I am interested in assessing the accuracy of the current 
asset pricing model for NPLs, specifically from the buy side. In particular, I 
am testing whether certain NPL loan characteristics, some of which are not 
directly controlled for in the current NPL pricing model, play a significant 
role in predicting profitability. The loan characteristics used in the current 
asset pricing model (such as, sponsor value, UPB, current interest rate and 
occupancy status) are not expected to be significant in determining profit 
2 
 
outcomes as they have already been accounted for in determining the purchase 
price of the asset (See Table 5 for current asset pricing model inputs).  
Using private company data, I use a standard linear regression model to 
examine the role of loan characteristics on NPL profitability. Intuitively, I 
find that properties in good and fair condition positively affect NPL 
profitability, relative to properties in poor or unknown condition. 
Surprisingly, I find that interest rates are negatively correlated with NPL 
profitability. This was unexpected because interest rates are a factor used to 
determine the purchase price in the current asset pricing model. I believe this 
outcome is due to interest rates being correlated with the probability of 
reperformance. Due to the particular strategy of the firm used in this study, 
NPLs which reperform are less profitable. I find a negative correlation with 
NPL profitability and properties located in New York. This is likely because 
New York is relatively more expensive than other states. I also find a very 
slight correlation with Delinquent Taxes and profitability. This outcome can be 
explained by the amount of property taxes being connected to property value, 
where assets with a larger amount of delinquent taxes may be more likely to 
have a higher property value. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
a background of the existing literature relating to NPLs on the macroeconomic 
level. Section 3 presents the existing literature relating to housing prices 
and variation of state foreclosure and liquidation laws. The data are described 
in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the methodology and presents the results. The 
final section concludes. 
II. Background 
The existing research on non-performing loans (NPLs) focuses mainly on 
their relationship with banking practices and/or macroeconomic correlations. 
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Some commonly used macroeconomic indicators include, GDP and unemployment. 
Curak, Pepur and Poposki (2013) look at determinants of NPLs, focusing on 
Southeastern Europe and find that both macroeconomic conditions and banking 
practices influence the number of non-performing loans in an economy. For NPLs, 
they find a negative relationship with GDP and bank size. They also find a 
positive relationship with inflation, real interest rates, and the solvency 
ratio. Macroeconomically, this suggests that NPLs become less prevalent as GDP 
increases and become more prevalent as inflation and interest rates increase. 
This also suggests that an individual bank will hold fewer NPLs in their 
portfolio as they grow larger and will hold a greater number of NPLs as their 
solvency ratio increases. Klein (2013), with the IMF, finds similar results 
when looking at Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE). He discovers 
a feedback loop between NPLs and economic conditions, where the number of NPLs 
in an economy will affect the state of the economy while economic conditions 
will also affect the amount of NPLs. In general, research relating to 
macroeconomic conditions finds that NPLs have a negative relationship with 
preferable economic conditions, where the number of NPLs will increase during 
times of recession.  
Some banking practices have also been linked to the existence of NPLs. 
Gosh (2015) evaluates banking practices and finds that bank profitability 
reduces the number of NPLs a bank will hold. He also finds that liquidity risks 
and poor credit quality increase NPL prevalence. This suggests that as banks 
take on greater risks, such as those associated with credit and liquidity, they 
will hold a larger number of NPLs in their portfolio. Looking at credit more 
specifically, Ranjan and Chandra Dhal (2003) find that variables of credit 
strongly affect bank-level NPAs (Non-performing assets) in India. Relating to 
terms of credit variables, they find that expectations of increasing interest 
rates will increase NPAs, while scope of credit maturity, healthier credit 
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culture, and better macroeconomic conditions reduce NPAs. This suggests that 
credit related risks will increase as credit maturity is lengthened and as 
credit culture diminishes. Intuitively, this also suggest that interest rates 
and macroeconomic conditions affect not only the number of NPLs in an economy 
but also the number of NPLs held by individual banks. In general, research 
relating to banking practices mainly finds that NPLs have a positive 
relationship with bank risk-taking behavior and a negative relationship with 
bank size and profitability.  
Only one paper I found looks at NPLs using non-bank data. Mahmood Rifat 
(2016) focuses on the determinants of NPLs in the Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions (NBFI) in Bangladesh. He finds that ROA differed significantly 
between organizations. Similarly, the data I use also focuses on NPLs in the 
private non-banking sector. However, I look more specifically at NPLs sold to 
a private investment firm due to continued nonperformance. This firm targets 
NPLs with a small probability of reperformance. There exits little to no 
research in this area, especially given the specific strategy of this firm. I 
intend to add to the literature by focusing on NPLs from the buy side and 
looking at determinants of NPLs profitability compared to the current NPL model, 
while focusing mainly on Midwestern and Southern U.S. states. This differs from 
the current research because I look at privately held non-bank owned NPLs to 
evaluate the financial processes involved from acquisition to liquidation. Based 
on the structure and strategy of this firm I will not look at the average NPL 
but instead those in significant distress and with little chance of re-
performance.  
III. Literature Review 
To my knowledge, there exists no literature on NPLs purchased by private 
for-profit firms relating to NPL asset pricing or profit outcomes. Because 
the literature in this area is scarce, I use exiting literature relating to 
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home valuation and state foreclosure, eviction and tax laws. Property 
valuation and state law variation are two important factors in which I was 
able to relate existing literature to NPL pricing and profitability. 
As noted above, two significant NPL characteristics used in the current 
NPL model of the firm are the sponsor value (similar to the acquisition BPO) 
and the state in which the property is located. The sponsor value is an 
estimate of the property value provided by the seller and the acquisition BPO 
is an estimate of the property value provided by a broker around the time of 
acquisition. The sponsor value is used as a preliminary value until the firm 
can acquire its own value estimates from an outside appraiser. Property value 
plays an inherently significant role in pricing an NPL and due to the unique 
strategy of the firm whose data is used in my research, it is especially 
significant. The firm targets NPLs with little change of reperformance which 
typically results in foreclosure and REO sale. Thus, the underlying home 
value is crucial in determining the purchase price. However, the purchase 
price, or NPL Value, is capped by the unpaid principal balance (UPB) because 
the UPB value is the maximum amount collectible in the case of reperformance. 
The state in which the property is located also plays an especially important 
role as it determines many associated timelines and costs affecting the NPL 
purchase price value. 
Many pieces come into play when valuing a residential property. Home 
prices are affected by both internal and external characteristics. Obviously, 
home values are affected by their inherent characteristics, such as property 
size, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, the year it was built and quality 
of upkeep, and additional home amenities. Location it another a key 
consideration in real estate valuation. Specifically, Bitter and Krause 
(2017) discuss the impact of neighborhoods on home values finding that 
certain neighborhood “packages” have a significant impact on home values. 
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There are a variety of neighborhood attributes which can contribute to home 
value. Kane, Riegg and Staiger (2006) focus on school quality in 
neighborhoods, finding that home prices vary significantly by school 
assignment zone boundaries. Housing prices also vary significantly by state 
and region. For example, Quigley (2005) found that housing costs in 
California are relatively high compared to other states. Similarly, home 
values are affected by geographical conditions associated with the locational 
variation mentioned above. Benson (1998) focuses on the impact of ocean views 
on home values. They find that the best ocean views increased home value by 
nearly 60% while even low-quality ocean views could increase home value by 
about 8%. Weather is another locational and geographical contributor to 
property values. Harrison, Smersh & Schwartz (2001) find that homes located 
within specific flood zones in Florida are on average worth less than 
comparable homes outside the flood zones.  
 Other external conditions also affect home prices. Intuitively, the 
state of the housing market will affect home prices (Quigley, 1999). 
According to Davis and Nieuwerburgh (2014), housing also has a “lead-lag” 
relationship with the business cycle. Thus, home prices will be lower 
directly preceding and during times of recession. Borio and McGuire (2004) 
note that traditional macroeconomic determinants of housing prices include 
interest rates, output growth and unemployment. They also find that housing 
prices often trend with equity prices and note that real home prices are 
affected by inflation.  
 State laws are another important factor in determining the costs of 
foreclosure, eviction and liquidation. These factors are included in the 
current pricing model for NPLs (See table 6 for current NPL model state 
assumptions). The variation in these laws is therefore also significant in 
determining the value of an NPL. Terrence and Herzog (1990), note that these 
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costs can be categorized into three areas: transaction costs, property costs, 
and opportunity costs. They define transaction costs as costs associated with 
foreclose and liquidation, such as attorneys’ fees, brokers’ commissions and 
title charges. Property taxes, insurance, utilities, repairs and property 
maintenance are provided as examples of property costs. Foregone interest is 
given as an example of an opportunity cost. Terrence and Herzog (1990) also 
state three additional major differences in foreclosure laws between states: 
1) Judicial vs nonjudicial procedure 2) the provision for a statutory right 
of redemption and 3) deficiency judgements. They note that sates in which the 
lender must use a judicial procedure to foreclose are costlier to firms 
because the process tends to take longer. Conversely, states allowing 
nonjudicial foreclosure, in which the lender can foreclose without going 
through the court system, tend to be quicker, and thus less costly. Statutory 
redemption relates to a borrower’s right to recover their ownership of a 
property which has been foreclosed (Terrence and Herzog, 1990). States which 
give borrowers this right can be costlier to the firm by delaying eviction 
and extending asset holding times. Extending holding timelines increases 
costs because the firm must pay certain property expenses periodically, such 
as utilities and maintenance. A deficiency judgment is a ruling made by a 
court in favor of the lender if a borrower’s mortgage foreclosure sale does 
not produce sufficient funds to pay the loan in full (Terrence and Herzog, 
1990). Because the firm caps their bid price by the UPB, deficiency 
judgements are less important in this case.  These state-specific foreclosure 
laws are significant in calculating time and transaction related costs 
associated with a given NPL.  
IV. Data 
The dataset used in the analysis is from a private asset management 
firm, Neighborhood Stabilization Capital Management (NSCM). This dataset was 
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chosen because it provides loan level details for all assets purchased by the 
firm (for example, loan ID, occupancy status, property condition, bankruptcy 
status, liquidation amount, liquidation date, reason for default, current 
interest rate, workout option, days in foreclosure, liquidation type, 
property address, investor pool, entity, deal name, funding date, unpaid 
principle balance (UPB), acquisition broker price opinion (BPO), purchase 
price, and sum of total remittance). This data was retrieved from the firm’s 
online database and remittance report. The workout option data has been 
excluded because it is collinear with liquidation type. The sum of total 
remittance was used as a reference but was excluded from the model because 
remittance data was captured through the IRR calculation. Assets currently 
under management have been excluded due to the limited information available 
for non-liquidated assets and to maintain a complete dataset. Besides the 
remittance data used in the IRR calculations, any data obtained after the 
time of acquisition was excluded for the purpose of evaluating the current 
NPL pricing model.   
The final sample includes 179 assets (that is, mortgage-backed notes 
and REO properties) both purchased and liquidated between 2014 and 2018. The 
majority of the sample includes properties from Midwestern, Southeastern and 
Northeastern states. The sample is comprised of 48 properties located in 
Illinois, 36 properties in Georgia, 26 properties in New Jersey and 16 
properties in Florida, 9 properties in Maryland, 7 properties in 
Pennsylvania, 6 properties in Ohio, 6 properties in New York, 6 properties in 
New England states, and 19 properties in other states. All states included in 
the other category contain fewer than 5 assets. As such, these remaining 
states are aggregated into a single category (See Table 4, Panel A for asset 
breakdown by state). 
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The internal rate of return (IRR) of each loan is used as a measure of 
profitability and is calculated using the total loan remittance over time. 
Days held is calculated as the difference between the Funding Date and the 
Liquidation Date. Sum of total remittance is calculated as the net remittance 
amount, excluding time. The liquidation amount provided is net of expenses 
and is used in the IRR calculation through the remittance report. Property 
condition and Neighborhood condition data was acquired from the servicers at 
the time of acquisition. Explanations for individual dummy variables are 
provided below. All other variables were exported directly from the database 
and are unadjusted (See Table 1 for variable definitions). 
Each asset in the sample is categorized as belonging to one of two 
mutually exclusive default reasons: Default reason and other. Default reason 
is used when no reason is give and is aggregated with assets in which the 
reasons given include: Other/No Applicable Code and Unable to Contact 
Borrower. Other default reasons include, temporary Loss or Reduction of 
income, unemployment, death or illness of Primary Borrower, excessive 
obligations, servicing problems, and marital difficulties. I define these 
variables using information provided by the servicers at the time of 
acquisition. For each category, I assign a value of one if the asset falls 
within the category, and zero otherwise. Majority of borrowers did not give a 
reason for default. 152 of the 179 assets fall within the Default/Other 
category meaning this category is limited in the information is can provide. 
Only 27 of the 179 borrowers provided a reason for default. (See Table 4, 
Panel B for asset breakdown by default reason). 
Assets are categorized as belonging to one of three mutually exclusive 
Occupancy Statuses: Vacant, Owner Occupied, and Other/Unknown. These 
variables are defined by who was living in the home at the time of 
acquisition. For each category, I assign a value of one if the asset falls 
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within the category, and zero otherwise. Non-owner-occupied assets are 
aggregated with other/unknown. 89 of the 179 assets fall under vacant, 74 of 
the assets fall under owner occupied and 16 of the assets fall under 
Other/Unknown. (See Table 4, Panel C for asset breakdown by occupancy status)  
Assets are categorized as belonging to one of two mutually exclusive 
bankruptcy statuses: BK and None. I define these variables by if the borrower 
declared bankruptcy while the firm held the loan. For each category, I assign 
a value of one if the asset falls within the category, and zero otherwise. 
Majority of the assets fall within the None category in which case the 
borrower did not declare bankruptcy. 43 of the 179 assets went into 
bankruptcy. The BK status includes chapters 11, 7 and 13. (See Table 4, Panel 
D for asset breakdown by bankruptcy status)  
Assets are categorized as belonging to one of three mutually exclusive 
Property Conditions: Good, Fair, and Poor/Unknown. I define these variables 
using information provided by the servicers at the time of acquisition. For 
each category, I assign a value of one if the asset falls within the 
category, and zero otherwise. 93 of the 179 assets were in good condition at 
the time of acquisition, 51 were in fair condition and 16 were either in poor 
condition or the condition was unknown (see Table 4, Panel E for asset 
breakdown by property condition). Poor and unknown were aggregated because 
they are the smallest categories, however, this category may provide limited 
information due to assets with unknown property conditions diluting the 
results of the assets in poor condition. Assets are similarly categorized as 
belonging to one of two mutually exclusive Neighborhood Conditions: Stable 
and Declining/Unknown. For each category, I assign a value of one if the 
asset falls within the category, and zero otherwise. These variables are also 
defined using information provided by the servicers at the time of 
acquisition. 139 of the 179 properties were located in stable neighborhoods 
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at the time of acquisition and 40 of the 179 were in either declining 
neighborhoods or the neighborhood condition was unknown (See Table 4, Panel F 
for asset breakdown by neighborhood condition). Declining and unknown were 
also aggregated because they are the smallest categories. Similarly, this 
category may also provide limited information due to assets with unknown 
neighborhood conditions being included with the assets in poor condition. 
Each asset in the sample is categorized as belonging to one of two 
mutually exclusive liquidation types: REO sale and other liquidation type. I 
define these variables by how the asset was sold. For REO, I assign a value 
of one if the asset was sold as an REO, and zero otherwise. Similarly, for 
other liquidation type, I assign a value of one if the asset was not sold as 
an REO, and zero otherwise. Other liquidation types include, note sales, 
third party sales, short sales, foreclosure sales, not listed, and one which 
was put back to the seller. 81 of the 179 assets were liquidated through REO 
sales and 71 of the 179 assets were liquidated in another form (See Table 4, 
Panel G for asset breakdown by state).  
Assets are categorized as belonging to one of three mutually exclusive 
entities: Southside NSP Trust 2016-1, Southside NSP Trust 2015-1, and Private 
Trust 2014-1. I define these variables by how and when the assets were 
funded. For each category, I assign a value of one if the asset falls within 
the category, and zero otherwise. 27 of the 179 assets fall under Southside 
NS Trust 2016-1, 79 fall under Southside NSP Trust 2015-1 and 73 fall under 
Private Trust 2014-1. (See Table 4, Panel H for asset breakdown by entity) 
Assets were categorized as belonging to one of five mutually exclusive 
Workout Options: Short Sale, Repayment Plan, Short Repay Plan, Modification, 
None/Other. I had defined these variables by weather and how a borrower 
became current on their mortgage.  For each category, I assigned a value of 
one if the asset fell within the category, and zero otherwise. Majority of 
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the assets fell within the none/Other category in which case an alternative 
work out option was used or, pertaining to majority of the assets within this 
category, there was no workout option and the home was foreclosed. This 
category was omitted because it is perfectly collinear with the liquidations 
types category. This is intuitive because certain workout options correlate 
with specific liquidation types. For example, if there was a loan 
modification, then the asset will be liquidated as a note sale. Similarly, if 
the asset had no workout option then it would be liquidated though an REO 
sale. Thus, this information is captured by the Liquidation Types category.  
V. Determinants of NPL Profitability and Purchase Price 
To formally identity the underlying causes of differences in NPL 
profitability, I perform a standard linear regression of the determinants of 
NPL pricing characteristics. Specifically, I estimate a model of NPL 
profitability of the following form: 
(1)           Yi = Xi1β1 +εi 
where Yi is the internal rate of return (IRR) which captures NPL 
profitability and i represents individual NPLs. X is a vector of observable 
characteristics, and 𝜀  is an error term with the usual properties. To provide 
a base comparison of what has already been captured in the asset pricing 
model, I re-estimate equation (1) by replacing the NPL measure of 
profitability with the NPL purchase price. This provides an understanding of 
the extent that each loan characteristic contributed to the initial price, 
under the current asset pricing model.  
Unsurprisingly, the majority of the loan characteristics are statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that either the variation in those loan 
characteristics have been adequately accounted for in the current asset 
13 
 
pricing model or the characteristics do not consistently contribute to 
specific profit outcomes. This is particularly unsurprising for the state, 
occupancy status, and Acquisition BPO variables because those are the primary 
characteristics used in the asset pricing model to determine the purchase 
price of the assets (See tables 2 and 3 for summary statistics and results).  
Interestingly, the current interest rate is statistically significant and 
negatively correlated with IRR, with a coefficient of -45.48. Interest rates 
are considered in the current asset pricing model and they also have a 
negative correlation with the purchase price. However, this implies that an 
increase in the interest rate will reduce the firms calculated purchase price 
but will still result in a lower profit outcome. Thus, the variation in the 
interest rate may not be adequately considered in the current NPL pricing 
model. This suggests that interest rates should be given greater 
consideration in the determination of the purchase price. According to the 
results, the firm should reduce its purchase price by a greater amount than 
it currently does with an increase in the interest rate to counterbalance the 
lower profit outcome.  
Delinquent taxes is statistically significant in contributing to 
profitability but has only a slightly positive correlation with IRR, with a 
coefficient of .00018. It is not statistically relevant to the Purchase Price 
as they are deducted directly from the purchase price. This suggests that 
delinquent taxes signify something slightly greater than their numerical 
amount. It is possible that this is a result of higher valued properties 
having a larger amount of property taxes. The acquisition BPO should capture 
the variation in property value, however, BPOs can vary significantly and it 
difficult to pinpoint the exact value of a given property.  
New York is statistically significant and negatively correlated with IRR 
with a coefficient of -11.546. This is likely because New York is relatively 
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more expensive than other states. This suggests that the firms model does not 
accurately account for the additional costs associated with properties in New 
York. According to the results, the firm should assign a lower purchase price 
than it currently does to properties in New York. However, only 6 of the 179 
assets are located in New York, making this a very small sample size. 
Additional data on properties in New York should be included to better asses 
this variable.  
Intuitively, properties in good and fair condition are both positively 
correlated with IRR, relative to properties in poor or unknown condition. 
They have coefficients of 3.13 and 2.53, respectively. Although intuitive, 
these results are still somewhat surprising as the variation in property 
condition should be captured though the acquisition BPO. However, BPO 
accuracy is limited by the significant room for error in property valuation.   
Unsurprisingly, the R2 is significantly smaller for IRR than for 
Purchase Price; 0.372 and 0.965, respectively. This was expected because the 
asset characteristics used in the model directly reflect the characteristics 
used in the asset pricing model to determine the purchase price. Intuitively, 
the loan characteristics considered in the model more adequately reflect the 
current pricing model than the true profit outcomes. Thus, additional 
variables would need to be included to more accurately predict profit levels. 
However, limiting the model to information available at the time of 
acquisition was expected to reduce the R2.  
Including additional NPL characteristics could create a more 
comprehensive model which would better predict profitability. For example, 
the variation in the BPOs of a given asset over time would likely be an 
important predictor of profit outcomes because the variation reflects the 
accuracy of those value estimates. If a property has BPOs that vary 
significantly, it is more likely that the value attributed to that asset 
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could be inaccurate. A property with a small variation in BPO values is more 
likely to have an accurate value attributed to it. Although significant, this 
information is unimportant in relation to the asset pricing model because an 
asset must be priced at the time it is acquired. BPOs are ordered 
periodically during the time an asset is held, making this information 
inaccessible at the time of acquisition. Thus, for the purpose of evaluating 
the current pricing model, information acquired after the time of acquisition 
was excluded from my model.  
VI. Conclusion 
I formally analyze the role of NPL loan characteristics in explaining NPL 
profit outcomes compared to the current pricing model for NPLs. To the best 
of my knowledge, this topic has not been examined in any previous studies. 
Existing literature looks largely at determinants of NPL prevalence in the 
economy and their relationship with banking practices. I am contributing the 
literature by evaluating determinants of NPL profitability within a private 
asset management firm. I use the internal rate of return (IRR) of each loan 
as a measure of profitability. I expected that factors included in the 
current NPL model would not be statistically significant in determining 
profit outcomes as those factors were considered in determining the purchase 
price of the asset.  
Surprisingly, I find that interest rates are statistically significant and 
negatively correlated with IRR. This is surprising because interest rates are 
considered in the current asset pricing model. The results suggest that 
greater weight should be given to interest rates in determining the purchase 
price of an NPL. Also surprising, I find that properties located in New York 
are negatively correlated with profitability. State assumption relating to 
costs and holding timelines are included in the current NPL model. However, 
the results suggest that additional consideration should be given to 
16 
 
properties in New York when determining a purchase price. I also find that 
delinquent taxes have a slightly positive correlation with NPL Profitability. 
This was unexpected as delinquent taxes are deducted directly from the 
purchase price, suggesting a slightly greater significant than their dollar 
amount.  
The NPL loan characteristics used in the model explain less than half the 
variation in IRR, suggesting that additional factors should be considered to 
better represent the total variation in profit outcomes. However, for the 
purpose of evaluating the current pricing model, I excluded any data acquired 
after the time of acquisition. Including additional NPL information attained 
after acquisition may be useful in creating a more comprehensive model of the 
determinants of NPL profitability, however, this would be unhelpful in 
contributing to predictors of the asset pricing model. When using only 
information available at the time of acquisition, that information is 
limited. Even if it were possible for the firm to retrieve additional 
information on each asset prior to acquisition, retrieving additional 
information may be costly. Asset information may have marginal benefits and 
the costs of retrieving additional data may outweigh those benefits.  
The results are also limited by the relatively small sample size of the 
data and the significant variation in IRR. Additional research should be 
performed with a larger sample size to more accurately analyze the impact of 
loan attributes on profitability, particularly on properties in New York. The 
variation in outcomes may be a result of both the size and youth of the firm. 
In particular, two pools of assets retrieved inaccurate BPOs resulting in 
very negative profit outcomes for those assets. This occurred during the 
early years of the firm’s life and operations have since been improved to 
prevent future BPO inaccuracy. It is possible that assets with bad BPOs could 
have skewed some results. Using data from a larger more mature company may 
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provide more precision in the results. With the small sample size of the data 
I was not able to exclude the assets with bad BPOs or some other potential 
outliers. Obtaining a larger sample size would likely be the best possible 
improvement to this study. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
IRR The rate of return that sets the NPV of all cash flows 
(both positive and negative) from the investment to ZERO.  
Individual asset IRRs are calculated from their total 
remittance. 
Current 
Interest Rate 
The proportion of the loan charged as interest to the 
borrow, expressed as an annual percentage of the loan 
outstanding. 
Delinquent 
Taxes 
The amount of property taxes unpaid after the payment due 
date. 
Current 
Principle and 
Interest 
Payment 
The current payment amount towards the principle owed and 
the amount determined by the interest rate. 
Current Taxes 
and Insurance 
Payment 
The payment toward the amount of principle owed and the 
amount determined by the interest rate 
Days in FC The number of days the asset was in foreclosure. 
Default Reason A dummy variable equal to one if no default reason was 
given by the borrower or the reason is otherwise unknown. 
Other (omitted) A dummy variable equal to one if a default reason was 
provided by the borrower. 
Owner Occupied A dummy variable equal to one if the property owner lived 
in the home at the time of acquisition. 
Other/Unknown A dummy variable equal to one if someone other than the 
property owner lived in the home at the time of acquisition 
or if the occupancy status was unknown. 
Vacant 
(omitted) 
A dummy variable equal to one if the property was vacant at 
the time of acquisition. 
Good A dummy variable equal to one if the property was in good 
condition at the time of acquisition. 
Fair A dummy variable equal to one if the property was in fair 
condition at the time of acquisition. 
Poor/Unknown 
(omitted) 
A dummy variable equal to one if the property was in good 
condition at the time of acquisition. 
Bankruptcy (BK) A dummy variable equal to one if the borrower declared 
bankruptcy. 
None (omitted) A dummy variable equal to one if the borrower did not 
declare bankruptcy. 
Stable A dummy variable equal to one if the neighborhood was 
stable at the time of acquisition. 
Declining/ 
Unknown 
(omitted) 
A dummy variable equal to one if the neighborhood was 
declining at the time of acquisition or if the neighborhood 
condition was unknown. 
REO Sale A dummy variable equal to one if the asset was liquidated 
through and REO sale. 
Other 
Liquidation 
Type (omitted) 
A dummy variable equal to one if the asset was not 
liquidated through and REO sale. 
SouthsideNSP 
Trust 2016 
A dummy variable equal to one if the asset were funded by 
the Southside NSP Trust 2016. 
SouthsideNSP 
Trust 2015 
A dummy variable equal to one if the asset were funded by 
the Southside NSP Trust 2015. 
Private Trust 
2014 (omitted) 
A dummy variable equal to one if the asset were funded by 
the Private Trust 2014. 
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Investor Pool Indicator of the investor pool in which the asset falls 
under. 
Deal Name Indicator of the deal name in which the asset falls under. 
Days Held The number of days the asset was held, calculated as the 
difference between the funding date and liquidation date. 
UPB The principle amount still owed on the loan. 
AcqBPO The broker price opinion obtained at the time of 
acquisition. 
Zip Address zip code. 
GA (omitted) A dummy variable equal to one if the property is located in 
Georgia. 
NJ A dummy variable equal to one if the property is located in 
New Jersey. 
FL A dummy variable equal to one if the property is located in 
Florida. 
IL A dummy variable equal to one if the property is located in 
Illinois. 
NY A dummy variable equal to one if the property is located in 
New York. 
MD A dummy variable equal to one if the property is located in 
Maryland. 
OH A dummy variable equal to one if the property is located in 
Ohio. 
PA A dummy variable equal to one if the property is located in 
Pennsylvania. 
New England A dummy variable equal to one if the property is located in 
a New England state. 
Other States A dummy variable equal to one if the property was not 
located in Georgia, New Jersey, Florida, Illinois, New 
York, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, or any New England 
States. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics      
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used 
in our study.    
The sample period is from 2015 to 2018. The definitions of the variables are provided in 
Table 1. 
      
 mean sd p25 p50 p75 
IRR 
 
0.672 4.450 -0.015 0.014 0.039 
Purchase Price 67658.490 57129.970 31436.220 57271.990 80644.560 
Current Interest Rate 0.058 0.020 0.050 0.058 0.065 
Delinquent Taxes 1387.342 6455.685 0.000 0.000 1046.000 
Current Principle and 
Interest Payment 3556.867 36975.460 465.560 679.250 932.920 
Current Taxes and Insurance 
Payment 291.016 245.785 120.590 249.920 440.240 
Days in Foreclosure (FC) 278.760 442.935 0.000 43.000 441.000 
Default Reason 1.611 10.754 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Other (omitted)      
Owner Occupied 0.822 5.507 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Other/Unknown  0.178 1.220 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Vacant (omitted)      
Good 1.033 6.911 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Fair 0.567 3.807 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Poor/Unknown (omitted)      
Bankruptcy (BK) 0.478 3.216 0.000 0.000 0.000 
None (omitted)      
Stable 1.544 10.311 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Declining/Unknown (omitted)      
REO Sale 1.200 8.020 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Other Liquidation Type 
(omitted)      
SouthsideNSP Trust 2016 0.300 2.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Southside NSP Trust 2015 0.878 5.876 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Private Trust 2014 (omitted)      
Investor Pool 7.615 4.364 3.000 8.000 10.000 
Deal Name 15.061 20.672 3.000 8.000 19.000 
Days Held 431.374 237.703 233.000 357.000 583.000 
Unpaid Principle Balance 
(UPB) 128795.400 109628.600 59859.470 105775.800 153863.600 
Acquisition BPO (AcqBPO) 117589.900 91123.110 63500.000 97500.000 142000.000 
GA (omitted)      
NJ 0.289 1.959 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FL 0.178 1.220 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IL 0.533 3.585 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NY 0.067 0.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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MD 0.100 0.702 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OH 0.067 0.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PA 0.078 0.554 0.000 0.000 0.000 
New England 0.067 0.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other States 0.211 1.442 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 3: NPL Loan Characteristics: Linear Regression Estimations 
This table presents the results of regressions of NPL Loan 
characteristics on IRR and Purchase Price. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *,**,***, respectively. 
   
 IRR Purchase Price 
CurrentInterestRate -45.47803** -161316.6*** 
 
(-2.39) (-2.71) 
DelinquentTaxes 0.0001859 -0.091278*** 
 
(3.11) (-0.49) 
PrincipleandInterestP -5.71e-06*** -0.0756715 
 
(-0.62) (-2.63) 
TaxesandInsurancePaym 0.0000852 -4.500637 
 
(0.05) (-0.90) 
DaysinFC -0.0002725 -4.114386* 
 
(-0.37) (-1.80) 
DefaultReason -1.198282 -2103.248 
 
(-1.39) (0.78) 
OwnerOccupied -0.6255507 -1310.846 
 
(-0.71) (-0.48) 
OtherUnkown -0.3628081 1380.225 
 
(-0.28) (0.33) 
Good 3.132552*** -30.01377 
 
(2.69) (-0.01) 
Fair 2.526089** 1249.455 
 
(2.13) (0.34) 
BK 0.7198147 -2622.612 
 
(0.95) (-1.10) 
Stable -1.833429 -3252.126 
 
(-1.43) (-0.81) 
REOSale -1.395161* -332.3978 
 
(-1.84) (-0.14) 
SouthsideNSPTrust20151 2.726646* -411.9387 
 
(1.83) (-0.09) 
SOUTHSIDENSPTRUST20161 0.3819479 -2802.783 
 
(0.13) (-0.32) 
InvestorPool -0.4316824 963.7667 
 
(-1.41) (1.01) 
DealName 0.076585 -237.4168 
 
(1.06) (-1.05) 
DaysHeld -0.0029275* 1.329684 
 
(-1.78) (0.26) 
UPB 1.09e-06 -0.0099328 
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(0.21) (-0.61) 
AcqBPO 4.36e-06 .6352212*** 
 
(0.70) (32.51) 
NJ 0.4943491 -4470.303 
 
(0.38) (-1.11) 
FL 0.4313081 3661.242 
 
(0.36) (0.97) 
IL -0.9088358 -1373.376 
 
(-0.94) (-0.45) 
NY -11.49263*** 2513.056 
 
(-5.36) (0.37) 
MD -2.134068 -226.9682 
 
(-1.34) (-0.05) 
OH 0.3481596 399.0185 
 
(0.19) (0.07) 
PA 2.097751 -6104.588 
 
(1.28) (-1.19) 
NewEngland -0.0756457 -7063.842 
 
(-0.04) (-1.05) 
OtherStates 1.978419 2456.018 
 
(1.44) (0.57) 
Constant 4.629093 8754.932 
 
(1.76) (1.06) 
Obs. 179 179 
R2 0.4147 0.9652 
Adj. R2 0.3008 0.9584 
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Table 4: Asset Breakdowns 
These tables present the breakdown of each dummy variable by possible 
aggregated subcategories and number of assets. 
 
Table 4, Panel A: 
Asset breakdown by 
State 
1.FL 16 
2.GA 36 
3.IL 48 
4.MD 9 
5.NJ 26 
6.NY 6 
7.OH 6 
8.PA 7 
9.New England: 6 
CT (3) 
MA (2) 
VT (1) 
10.Other States: 19 
CO (2) 
CT (3) 
IA (2) 
IN (2) 
MN (2) 
NC (4) 
TX (5) 
Total 179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
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Table 4, Panel B: Asset breakdown by 
Default Reason 
1.Default Reason 149 
Default Reason (140) 
Unable to Contact Borrower (7) 
Other/NO Applicable Codes (2) 
2.Other 30 
Temporary Loss/Reduction of 
Income 
(7) 
Death/Illness of Primary 
Borrower 
(4) 
Excessive Obligations (11) 
Unemployment (3) 
Servicing Problems (2) 
Payment Dispute/Due Date (2) 
Marital Difficulties (1) 
Total (179) 
 
 
 
Table 4, Panel C: Asset Breakdown 
by Occupancy Status 
1.Vacant 89 
2.Owner Occupied 74 
3.Other/Unknown 16 
Non-Owner Occupied (7) 
Other/Unknown (9) 
Total 179 
 
 
 
Table 4, Panel D: Asset Breakdown 
by Bankruptcy Status 
1.None 136 
2.BK Chapter 43 
BK 7 (24) 
BK 11 (1) 
BK 13 (18) 
Total 179  
0 50 100 150 200
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Assets by Default Reason
Number of Assets
0 20 40 60 80 100
Other/Unknown
Owner Occupied
Vacant
Assets by Occupancy Status
Number of Assets
0 20 40 60 80 100
Other/Unknown
Owner Occupied
Vacant
Assets by Occupancy Status
Number of Assets
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Table 4, Panel E: Asset Breakdown by 
Property Condition 
1.Good 93 
2.Fair 51 
3.Poor/Unknown 35 
Poor (7) 
Unknown (28) 
Total 179 
 
 
 
Table 4, Panel F: Asset Breakdown by 
Neighborhood Condition 
1.Stable 139 
2.Declining/Unknown 40 
Declining (7) 
Unknown (33) 
Total 179 
 
 
 
Table 4, Panel G: Asset Breakdown by 
Liquidation Type 
1.REO Sale 108 
2.Other Liquidation Type 71 
Note Sale (27) 
Third Party Sale (20) 
Short Sale/Short Payoff (3) 
Foreclosure Sale (1) 
Not Listed (19) 
Put Back to Seller (1) 
Total 179 
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Table 4, Panel H: Asset 
Breakdown by Entity 
SOUTHSIDE NSP TRUST 2016-1 27 
Southside NSP Trust 2015-1 79  
Private Trust 2014-1 73  
Total 179 
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Table 5: Asset Pricing Model Inputs  
This table presents the factors used in the current NPL asset pricing model 
for NS Capital. These loan characteristics are used to determine the 
purchase price. 
Loan 
Characteristic 
Definition 
Current Status Status Options: 
 
30-59 Days (delinquent) 
 
60- 89 Days (delinquent) 
 
90 + Days (delinquent) 
UPB Unpaid Principle balance  
Sponsor Value Estimated property value provided by seller (used as 
preliminary estimate prior to acquisition BPO) 
Next Payment 
Due Date 
Date of next borrower payment 
Interest Rate Interest rate on mortgage 
Occupancy 
Status 
Status Options: 
 
Owner Occupied 
 
Vacant 
 
Other/Unknown 
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Table 6: Current NPL Asset Pricing Model State Assumptions 
These tables present the state assumptions for all states included in the 
dataset. These assumptions are incorporated into the asset pricing model to 
determine the purchase price. 
 
Table 6, Panel A: Eviction Assumptions 
State Evic 
Timeline 
Evict 
Costs 
EvictConf-
Redemp 
Evict 
Most 
Frequent 
EvictNotes 
IA 45 850     None 
IL 219.5 1200 Confirmation 30-45 
days 
Also, a 30 day right 
to possession once the 
sale confirms before 
you can start eviction 
IN 40 850   - Up to 1-year 
redemption if 
mortgagee pursues a 
deficiency judgment or 
lender forecloses with 
redemption 
LA 120 750   - None 
MA 75 750   - None 
MD 195 1200 Ratification 45-60 
days 
Cannot begin marketing 
until judge has signed 
order of ratification 
MN 57 950 Redemption 6 
months. 
If 
vacant, 
can 
shorten 
1 year if over 10 
acres OR if debt is 
less than 2/3 original 
mortgage 
NC 35 750 Confirmation 10 days Additional 10 day 
upset bid period 
NJ 140 1200 Redemption 10 days None  
NY 172.5 1200   -  None  
OH 103.5 1000 Confirmation 45-60 
days 
None  
PA 110 1000     None. Note: cannot 
begin eviction until 
deed has been recorded 
TX 55 850   - None 
VT 40 850 Redemption 6 months  Can be shortened if 
there is no equity in 
the property 
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Table 6, Panel B: Foreclosure Assumptions 
State Fcl 
Judicial 
Fcl Non-
Judicial 
Fcl 
Comment 
Fcl 
Process 
Period 
FCL 
Timeline 
Fcl 
Redemption 
FCL 
Costs 
CO • • Judicial 
rarely 
145 191   800 
CT •   Judicial 
only 
62 280   1500 
FL •   Judicial 
only 
135 390   750 
GA • • Judicial 
rarely 
37 180   2750 
IA • • Trustee 
Sale 
Voluntary 
160 205 20 600 
IL •   Judicial 
only 
300 472 90 5250 
IN •   Judicial 
only 
261 296   1000 
LA •   Judicial 
only 
180 540   1150 
MA •   Judicial 
only 
75 338   1300 
MD •   Judicial 
only 
46 215   5250 
MN • • Non-
Judicial 
mostly 
100 310 180 2000 
NC • • Non-
Judicial 
mostly 
110 150   1500 
NJ •   Judicial 
only 
270 455 10 5250 
NY •   Judicial 
only 
445 1050   5250 
OH •   Judicial 
only 
217 203   2800 
PA •   Judicial 
only 
270 630   4250 
TX • •  Non-
Judicial 
mostly 
27 70   850 
VT •   Judicial 
only 
95 390 240 1700 
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Table 6, Panel C: REO, Tax and HPI Assumptions 
 
REO 
  
Tax HPI 
 
State REO 
Months 
REO Days REO State 
Speed 
Tax Rate HPI - 2015 HPI - 2016 
CO 6 90 2 1.08% 360.5 392.8 
CT 8 120 3 1.72% 100.0 102.5 
FL 5 120 4 1.20% 100.0 102.5 
GA 6 181.5 3 1.52% 100.0 102.5 
IA 8 90 3 2.15% 252.7 258.6 
IL 6 181.5 4 2.50% 100.0 102.5 
IN 6 90 2 2.12% 244.8 251.1 
LA 6 120 3 1.02% 100.0 102.5 
MA 8 90 3 1.07% 621.7 652.4 
MD 6 181.5 4 3.00% 100.0 102.5 
MN 6 120 2 1.27% 309.2 325.0 
NC 8 120 3 1.10% 302.5 311.8 
NJ 6 181.5 2 3.76% 100.0 102.5 
NY 6 181.5 4 3.76% 100.0 102.5 
OH 8 242 3 1.81% 100.0 102.5 
PA 6 181.5 3 1.70% 100.0 102.5 
TX 6 120 1 2.57% 234.8 253.0 
VT 9 90 4 2.06% 436.2 439.0 
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